With the increased utilization of cognitive models for designing user interfaces several disciplines started to contribute to acquiring and representing knowledge about users, artifacts, and tasks. Although a wealth of studies already exists on modeling mental processes, and although the goals of cognitive engineering have becom e quite clear over the last decade, essential epistemological and methodological issues in the context of developing user interfaces have remained untouched. However, recent challenging tasks, namely designing information spaces for distributed user comm unities, have led to a revival of well known problem s concerning the representation of knowledge and related issues, such as abstraction, navigation through information spaces, and visualization of abstract knowledge. All of these issues are associated with mental processes and thus, might becom e part of cognitive models. In this paper we reveal epistemological and methodological assumptions in the ® eld of cognitive modeling as well as their implications for user interface design. It turns out that in order to achieve the goal of developing hum an-oriented (in contrast to technology-driven) hum an-computer interfaces developers have to develop knowledge of the structure and the representational dynam ics of the cognitive systems which are interacting with the computer. We show that in a ® rst step it is necessary to study and investigate the diOE erent levels and forms of representation that are involved in the interaction processes between computers and human cognitive systems. We propose a hybrid user modeling approach as part of the task-based development procedure in TADEUS (Task Analysis/Design/End User Systems). The hybrid approach does not only enable the representation of functional roles end users have to perform, but also how end users perform these roles, i.e. the representation and re¯ection, if not prediction of their behavior. This way, holistic system developm ent that equally takes into account the organizational requirem ents and the end user reality at work places is facilitated.
Introduction
Starting with Rasm ussen (1986) cognitive engineering has been established as an interdisciplinary ® eld with knowledge representation as one of its core issues, in particular in the context of human-computer interaction, e.g. W oods et al. (1988, p. 3) . At that tim e a strong need for hum an-oriented design had been expressed, since in the ® eld of operator workplace design novel design solutions were required. It has been recognized that the introduction of an interactive computer system often changes the work environment and the cognitive demands placed on employees. Several ® ndings help to detail the changes caused by the use of com puter systems:
· Although the physical work load can be decreased at most of the workplaces through the utilization of computer systems, in some cases the mental workload m ight increase for particular users, due to inherent problems in information systems, such as according to Oliver (1995): · disorientation · navigation ine ciency, and · cognitive overload.
· Although computers enhance the potential in assistance of work, that extension might require revisiting the allocation of functions to humans and machines for human ± computer interaction (e.g. Kantowitz et al. 1987) .
As a consequence, the potentials of com puter systems have to be tuned to the context of their utilization (H ollnagl et al. 1983) . In order to achieve the contextsensitive utilization of technological artifacts designers need mechanisms to represent these contexts, i.e. on one hand, an adequate cognitive language of description (Rasm ussen 1986), and on the other hand, a representa-tion of the end user tasks and their organization (Johnson, 1992) . This task should be accomplished through cognit ive engine ering. It has been established as a traditional applied cognitive science. The requirement for an analysis and speci® cation of semantic and pragm atic aspects has been stressed from that time on up to recently, e.g., Roth et al. (1987) .
In the following we will term the speci® cation of the sem antic and pragm atic aspects of a dom ain representation. It might describe mental processes as well as the results of those processes (see also Figure  1 , where two diOE erent externalized models of neural representations are given). W e term representations of mental processes as well as their results cognitiv e models. Such models help individuals to understand what knowledge of the world is needed and how this knowledge can be used to achieve eOE ective performance' (W oods et al. 1988, p.34) . In order to achieve eOE ective performance, a translation of work tasks into the functions of the computer system has to be performed by the individuals interacting with the computer system, term ed end users (M oran 1984) . The activity of mapping the m ental m odels to representations will be termed cogn itive modeling. Overall bene® ts of cognitive modeling are exp ected in terms of · predictability of hum an behavior in the course of human-computer interaction, · avoidance of errors in the course of task accomplishment, and · improved usability of interfaces, based on the represented knowledge about mental processes.
The construction of cognitive models requires to take into account several activities and steps, since human perception and learning are assum ed to occur along a certain path of actions, involving several key elem ents of hum an cognition. Traditional cognitivists, such as Olson et al. (1990) , assum e that the non-observable processes of cognition are based on the interpretation of perceived physical activities, and on intentional speci® cation of actions that are actually executed. Goals and expectations form a background again st which the interpretation and speci® cation of actions occur. Unfortunately, only few components and transitions, such as the memory performance checking intentions, have been investigated empirically (Norman 1986 ).
According to Norman (1983) , setting up a model of cogn ition involves several perspectives, nam ely the perspective of the developer and the ones of the end users that are involved in the development. As a consequence, several types of cognitive models of a target system can be distinguished:
(i) the mental models of the end users of the target system: these representations are those internal m odels that can be speci® ed explicitly through one or more conceptual models by means of knowledge elicitation methods; (ii) the conceptual model of the target system: this is the external model that has to be developed by the designer by using elicited knowledge from several end users; (iii) the developer' s conceptual model of the end user' s mental model of the target system: this is the m odel of the developer that he / she has in m ind in the course of knowledge elicitation and the speci® cation of the conceptual model of the target system.
In the traditional understanding of cognitive modeling all of the listed models are involved. The process for the construction of knowledge is driven by the demand to improve the understanding of individuals with respect to features of interactive systems. As Figure 1 shows it is assum ed that developing this process is a two-step procedure. The goals for knowledge construction are given through the com puter system itself, since it re¯ects the outcom e of the design and im plementation process. The ® rst model re¯ects the perspective of the developer: The Conceptual (Representational) M odel of the (target) Com puter System (listed under (ii) ) represents what the software developers are expecting or have expected as outcome of their work. It contains the results of the transformation of end-user and task requirements to technical functionality. This model is traditionally described through some kind of notation or language, such as semantic networks or constructs in ® rst order logic, respectively. It contains a m ore or less analog representation of the goals implemented in the computer system at hand. It is also that model users apply in order to interpret the technical functionality of an artifact. This model com prises more or less knowledge about how to use system functions, rather than conveying the rationale behind, nam ely: · why they have been developed this way, · why they have to be used the way they have to be used, and · when to use them.
In order to succeed in interactive task accomplishm ent users have to connect their mental models to the cognitive model that explicitly states the go als of developers that have been implemented (user perspective). Since the users' goals might not correspond to the ones from the designer' s cognitive model, in traditional cognitive modeling user goals have to be related to the designer' s goals exp licitly before they can be internalized by each of the end users. The second cognitive model (Externalized M ental M odel of Com puter System in Figure 1 ) listed under (iii), is created. Finally, internal mental activities are assumed to occur, based on the contents of the second cognitive model, leading to the internal model as listed under (i).
M ental abilities are considered to be part of a`human information processor' and its decomposition of speci® c tasks in term s of goals and other components. For instance, in G OM S (Card et al. 1983 , Olsen et al. 1990 ) goals, operators, methods an d selection rules are distinguished to model human ± computer interaction. Hence, the semantic and pragm atic aspects of the relationship of humans to their environm ent are speci® ed through goals of age nts and the constraints in the environm ent of the agent. Human ± computer interaction is then understood to be driven by the execution of actions to achieve goals.
In questioning the understanding of human ± computer interaction as an exchange of data or information based on the goal-driven execution of actions we will apply a systemic perspective of cognitive engineering, nam ely rethinking human ± com puter interaction as a mutually modulation of system s. Interaction is considered to be a mutual m odulation in¯uencing the respective (knowledge / representation) system so that a certain task can be achieved. Intentions becom e behaviors and activities on the human side, computation results are prepared as output on the machine side. W hat is referred to as human ± computer interaction, is a multi-level, multi-channel, and multi-modal interaction process between two representation system s. Figure  2 illustrates the result from that shift, nam ely from exp licitly goal-driven to representational systems matching behavior param eters along task accomplishm ent instead of matching developer and user goals explicitly. In applying this perspective hum an ± computer interaction becomes the m utual adaptation of two systems involved : the com puter system and the cognitive system of the user. In modeling the user this way, cognitive modeling will not have to address an externalized and internal mental model of end users any more. The transition between explicit and tacit m ental representations will be resolved by unifying both perspectives through sub-symbolic representations and behavior patterns. Cognitive m odeling partially becomes behavioristicÐ this paradigm has been termed neo-behavioristic (Stary et al. 1995) .
However, the utilized representation scheme provides an interface to the ® rst cognitive model identi® ed in Figure 1 , nam ely the conceptual model of the com puter system developed by the designer. Since the representation of the conceptual model will be based on the end user tasks, it has to be considered as a representation of commonly agreed objectives for interactive task accomplishment. However, each end user is m odeled through a single cognitive system with behavior based on direct, steady and adaptive modulation. This way, not only tasks might be perceived individually, but also the organization of data (required for task accomplishment), and the navigation through features for interaction at the user interface.
As a consequence, developing a human ± com puter interface alw ays requires the ® nding and construction of a representational and computational structure that meets the constraints given by the cognitive dynam ics of the potential users. Capturing the cognitive dynam ics is in particular relevant due to the · incom pleteness and · instability, due to the lack of accuracy, of mental models C. Stary and M . F. Peschl with respect to the behavior of com puter systems. As Norman (1983) has investigated,`most people' s understanding of the devices they interact with is surprisingly meager, imprecisely speci® ed, and full of inconsistencies, gaps and idosyncratic quirks' (p. 8). Since constructivist modulation allows m odeling steady changes from the individual' s perspective, both the incompleteness and the instability of the externalized and the internal mental model can be cap tured accordingly. As computer systems / program s as well as input / output devices can be developedÐ within certain technical and economic limitsÐ more or less arbitrarily, the`cognitive constraints' have to be considered one of the starting points for the developm ent of interactive systems.
Although cognitive systems are able to adapt to new situations over time, such as standard features at the user interface, the goal of human ± computer interface development is to provide hum an-oriented access features to the structures being processed by the computer program , e.g. Johnson (1992) . Humanoriented user interface development requires at least a rough understanding of the cognitive processes involved in these interactions (Stacy 1995) . In order to enable an epistemologically and empirically sound integratio n of cogn itive m odeling based on constructivist understanding of human ± computer interaction into techniques and processes for user interface developm ent, in (Peschl et al. 1998) we suggest revealing empirical knowledge about cogn itive systems, their structure, and their dynam ics. Based on these ® ndings theories can be constructed that describe and explain the observed (cognitive) phenomena when accomplishing tasks. These steps should form the basis for the developm ent of (computational) cogn itive models for particular users, as traditionally developed in (cogn itive) psychology and cognitive sciences (Andersen 1990 , Eckardt 1993 , Johnson-Laird 1993 , Oshersen et al. 1990 , Posner 1989 . Then, based on these models, human ± computer interfaces might be constructed or ad apted accordingly. This kind of interface should ® t the cognitive dynam ics of humans: In order to implement this overall goal several principles for designing and evaluating user interfaces have been identi® ed, such as the suitability for tasks in cogn itive ergonomics, e.g., Ravd en et al. (1989) or task appropriateness in software ergonomics, e.g., Stary (1996b ) . Although these principles have been explained and based on more or less empirical ® ndings, most of them still lack operational de® nitions, see e.g., for adaptation (Stary et al. 1997b ) . This de® ciency can be exp lained through the lack of epistem ologically sound development of concepts in the ® eld of human ± com puter interaction, starting with empirical results and subsequent theory ® nding for modeling hum an individuals.
The problem of knowledge representation plays a crucial role in this context, since mental models require some mechanism of representation to be utilized for user interface development. Consequently, we are going to exam ine the diOE erent levels and forms of knowledge (representation) involved in the interaction betw een hum ans and com puters. It will become apparent in the sections to come that developers can not only gain clarity and learn a lot from these considerations, but they are also enabled to explain shortcomings and failu res of solutions as soon as cognitive modeling becomes part of the user-interface development process.
In section 2 conceptual modeling from the cognitive engineering perspective is contrasted with the constructivist understanding of hum an ± computer interaction. The introduced framework is used in section 3 to model hum an-and task-centered interaction. First, shortcomings of sym bolic representation systems, in particular for m odeling cognitive processes from the neuroscienti® c perspective, are identi® ed. Then, a proposal to overcome some of the existing lim itations is introduced. Section 4 concludes the paper through summarizing the achieved results and sketching further research activities.
Traditional cognitive engine ering versus constructivist understanding of hum an ± com puter interaction
First, related work will be discussed (i) with respect to the objectives of this study and the derived requirem ents for human-oriented modeling in section 2.1, (ii) with respect to existing analys es and re¯ections of cognitive m odels as fundam ental elements of cognitive engineering activities (section 2.2). In section 2.3, the constructivist framew ork is introduced and contrasted to the traditional understanding of cognitive m odeling. In section 2.4 we will wrap up the pitfalls in knowledge acq uisition and representation that are highly related to the traditional understanding of cognitive engineering, but can be removed through the constructivist understanding of hum an ± computer interaction.
H um an-oriented cognit ive mode ling
In several application domains, such as manufacturing, the request for human-oriented cognitive modeling have become more evident: According to BoÈ hle et al. · Human knowledge and activities are not guided exclusively through rational behavior. H owever, conventional knowledge acquisition and representation techniques follow the principle of rationality, assum ing some type of ideal user accomplishing tasks in an optimized way. De® ning an optim al functional role behavior (without taking into account the social and perceived reality of the individuals) implements a rationalistic tradition of thought rather than a human-oriented modeling approach (W inograd et al. 1986 ).
· Tacit knowledge (Polanyi 1996) and tacit skills (W ood 1986) are essential for successful task accomplishment. In case these skills are not taken into account, humans tend to adap t to procedures given by machines and these skills are elim inated from the work practice. The consequence is a decrease in quality of task accomplishment. However, in particular for complex processes, such as in manufacturing, tacit skills are of decisive importance for the quality of work results and worker satisfaction.
From comm unication by mean s of language we know that successful communicatio n requires mutual adjustment of the utterances of the speaker to the listener' s state of knowledge. If this adjustment fails misunderstandings and m isinterpretations of utterances are likely to occur. In this case, the knowledge of the listener does not help him / her to ® nd out the intended semantics of utterances. In addition, the speaker may even want to take into account what the listener assumes the speaker knows, and so on. This in® nite m utual knowledge problem, e.g., Perner et al. (1988) , might in¯uence communication, if there is no agreement on the common sense understanding at some point. W inograd et al. (1986) have termed this com mon sense understanding tradition' partners should share in communication or interaction. It is not clear for hum ans, how much of this common understanding of the mind actually is innate and how much communicative competence has to be acq uired actively, e.g., Fodor (1988) . How ever, cognitive m odels more or less represent the common sense understanding of a problem or an artifact. The less of the shared tradition they represent, the more likely are misunderstandings between end users and designers.
Another domain of interest with demand for humanoriented cognitive engineering has been de® ned through the introduction of global information spaces, such as the Internet, for a variety of end users. For instance, Brandt (1997) suggests to introduce constructivist concepts when users should become acquainted with ill-structured information in networked systems. He argues that constructivism shows a way to migrate already existing knowledge at the side of the end users, with novel concepts and inputs more eOE ectively. Although Brandt recognizes the bene® ts of constructivist cognitive m odeling, he does not conclude that techniques for representing knowledge have to take into account individual diOE erences, e.g., Thorndyke et al. (1980) , in order to achieve the intended strengthening of mental models through constructivist learning.
Traditional cognitive engineering
In the ® eld of human ± computer interaction cognitive modeling has rarely been analyzed systematically. In the following the most in¯uential conceptual analyses for our study will be discussed. The selection of the previous analyses has been based on the observation that for the description of the contents of cognitive models, both the externalized mental one and the conceptual one, techniques from knowledge representation or theoretical computer science, such as ® rst order logic or graph theory, have been applied. Caroll et al. (1988) consider mental models to comprise knowledge about how com puter systems work. They have also identi® ed several perspectives for cognitive modeling:
· the task perspective in terms of goals and sub-goals users may achieve utilizing system features. This perspective is the one that is assumed to be directly supported through conventional techniques from arti® cial intelligence for acquisition and representation, such as interview ing key users and specifying through ® rst order logic.
· The interface perspective comprising the knowledge users need to accomplish a task utilizing the data and interaction styles of a system in a certain sequence. In order to represent interface knowledge from diOEerent perspectives, traditional representation schemes of computer science have been extended, e.g. gram mars (Johnson 1992) .
· the architecture perspective comprising knowledge about the storage of data, access functions and internal processes (¯ow of data and control) of computer systems. Traditionally, techniques from software engineering or database managem ent, such as object hierarchies and entity-relationship diagram s are utilized for representation, respectively.
In order for a m ental representation to become an externalized (cognitive) model Caroll et al. (1988) have identi® ed the following elements:
(i) the set of possible inputs; and (ii) the set of possible outputs; as well as (iii) a highly complex, non-linear function that relates the inputs to outputs (i.e. the representational structure).
Such representations then could be used during learning, problem solving and rationalization. This adopted perspective from natural science is exactly the one addressed by W inograd et al. (1986) when they refer to the rationalistic tradition of thought.
Another attempt of analytical re¯ection on the meaning of m ental representations has been performed by M oray (1993) . In interpreting m ental models as mappings from external systems to hum an cognition he has identi® ed the following categories of m ental models:
· M ental models as imperfect copies of external systems. This type of model is created when humans are not capable of grasping the full complexity of external systems, according to Bainbridge (1991) . · M ental m odels as logical relationships am ong abstract entities and operations. This type of model is utilized to represent the way in which humans reason about syllogistic problems, according to Johnson-Laird (1983) .
· M ental models as a description of reasoning. This approach is used to specify problem solving of scienti® c, causal or several logical problem s, according to Andersen (1983) , Gentner et al. (1983), and Newell (1989) .
Similar to Caroll et al., M oray intended to clarify the possible meanings of cognitive models. He considered it not to be su cient to identify cognitive models as what users know exactly about software. His contribution has been aim ed at considering cognitive models as representations of the knowledge users have about certain aspects about computer systems. In order to bridge the gap between the various perspectives listed above, in contrast to Caroll et al. (1988) , he proposed the use of a unifying notation, nam ely the one known from lattice theory. Adopting this notation hierarchy as well as causal eOE ects of knowledge, entries (nodes) in the lattice can be represented. Caroll et al. (1988) have proposed som e methodological guidelines in the sense of the rationalistic tradition, but have not addressed the representation of knowledge in the course of know ledge acquisition and processing.
Having reviewed related work to our study we are able to conclude: W ith respect to user interface design representation and acquisition the analysis perform ed by Caroll et al. (1988) and M oray (1993) show that, besides some notational proposals there is still neither a common term inological nor semantic ground where new m ethodologies based on empirical evidence could arise. As a consequence, in the next section we will study the system s involved and lay ground for a framework that allows a non-rationalistic but human -centered developm ent of cognitive models.
The interactive system revisited
In the following we will detail the constructivist perspective on human ± computer interaction with respect to the overall concept of interaction, the involved components and systems: the user, the environment, the computer system. The components and systems are then further discussed in the context of representation in section 3.
The situation designers or analysts face when developing a user-oriented human ± computer interface and / or a model of cognition involves several parties and components that can be considered as particular system s:
· the user can be characterized as a cognitive system that tries to solve some problem or to accomplish a task more e ciently by making use of a com puter system; · the com puter can be characterized as a system transform ing inputs into outputs in a non-linear manner;
· the devices an d modalities used for interaction (in / output) provided by the computer system enable the interaction between the cognitive system`user' and the com puter system; · the user' s sensory and motor systems: the user' s particular interaction devices allow that external stimuli (such as pixels on a screen) may enter the (neural) representation system (via the visual system, tactile receptors, acoustic system etc.) and that internal representations can be externalized via behavioral actions. These behavioral actions (might) change the environm ental structure, e.g., by moving the mouse, hitting a key of the keyboard etc.;
· the observer: in order to describe or predict behavior there has to be an observer. The observer has access to both the internal structures of the computer system and the behavioral structures of the user. In m ost cases this observer is also the designer of the human ± computer interface and / or of the cognitive model.
However, the access to the user' s internal representational structures is very limited, as the user is able to externalize a small fraction of knowledge via behavioral actions, such as language . It is the task of the designer to develop an adequate model of the cognitive processes and of the potential user' s internal representations (and their dynam ics). The constructivist approach facilitates this task by making use of neuroscienti® c theories and ® ndings from cognitive science.
Investigating the process of human ± computer interaction, designers have to be aw are that they are not dealing with a one-way interaction, but with system s that try to mutually in¯uence and trigger each other in a more or less bene® cial way. As it is the case in alm ost any interaction between a cognitive system and its environment or other cognitive systems, designers have to deal with a feedback relationship. The ultim ate goal of this relationship is to establish m ore or less stable feedback loop based on`smooth' interactions and on eOE ectively triggering the respective representation / processing system.
In this type of interaction the user triggers the execution of a certain part of the computer components (program , devices) leading to a certain action within the computer system. In most of the cases the result of this action is somehow externalized and made accessible to the user, e.g. by displaying it on a screen or by acoustic output. In an y case, the computer system' s output perturbs the user' s representational system, which in turn causes some responses by the user. These responses are externalized via the user' s motor systems leading to a perturbation of the computer system, and so forth.
The addressed interactions between the user and the computer system do not only involve mechanical processes, but, more im portantly, the transfer of knowledge / representations. Consequently, there have to be devices that act as interfaces between these two systems, as their internal representational structures are not necessarily com patible. At a ® rst glance the computer system and the cognitive system do not seem to be compatible. In order to design eOE ective interaction between the user' s an d the computer system' s representational structures, both systems have to be considered to be responsible for creating som e kind of compatibility between the internal representations of the participating systems in interaction. Their task is to transform the internal representations into structural changes of the environment, such as activating a muscle that moves a mouse or activating a pixel on a screen, and vice versa. The human and the computer are able to interact with each other via mutually changing the environm ental structure / dynam ics (key strokes, pointing with the mouse, patterns of pixels on the screen etc.). Similar to communication (natural, spoken, or written language ) interaction only becomes possible through the use of the environm ent as a carrier for mutual stimulation.
2.3.1. The User as a Cognitive System. The key player for cognitive modeling and human ± computer interaction is the hum an cognitive system . It is not only interacting with the computer system, but also with the rest of its environm ent, including other cognitive systems. From observing a cognitive system which is acting (successfully) in its environment, we can conclude that this system has to possess some kind of knowledge about its environm ent. Otherwise, it would not be possible to behave adequately in the environm ent. In case of behaving randomly the survival of the system is not very likely.
Cognitive scientists postulate the existence of a representation system that holds some kind of structural information about the environm ent and on how to survive within the constraints of a given internal and external environm ent. Furtherm ore, cogn itivists assum e that the cognitive system makes use of its representation system, in order to generate adequate behavior for survival and / or successful interaction with the environment, e.g., Andersen (1990) , Boden (1990) , Posner (1989) , Osherson et al. (1990) .
To achieve adequate behavior and survival a cognitive system attempts to establish a stable (feedback) relationship both inside the system and with the environmentÐ compare with the concept of homeostasis, e.g., M aturana et al. (1980) , Varela et al. (1991) . In humans and most other natural cogn itive systems, the nervous system is assumed to be the substratum for the representation system. The neural architecture besides the body structure (Peschl 1994a, b) holds / embodies all of the particular cognitive system ' s know ledge. Thus, it is responsible for its behavioral dynam ics.
2.3.2. The Environment. Any cognitive system is embedded into its environment. The environment can be characterized as a¯ow of energy and inform ation consisting of per se meaningless patterns and regularities. From the constructivist perspective the term environment' refers in principle to Kant' s concept of the`thing-in-itself' . It cannot be accessed directly. In spite of all eOE orts of science to ® nd out more about thè true' or`objective' nature / structure of the environm ent, cognitive systems are only able to perceive representations / constructs of the environm ent, nam ely, those representational constructs that are generated by the nervous system in the course of interacting with the environm ent as well as with its own neural states.
It is only in the process of interaction with a cogn itive system that environm ental states / patterns receive individual meaning. According to Roth (1991 Roth ( , 1994 meaning or semantics is the speci® c in¯uence or the eOE ect that environmental states / dynam ics have on a speci® c cognitive / representational system, i.e. on the structure and the current state of a particular cognitive system. The representational structure / state itself is the result of all phylo-and onto-genetic developm ents of the particular cogn itive system ( = the total of the system' s experiences' , i.e. the interpretations the cogn itive system has performed).
In hum an ± computer interaction we are dealing with two coupled dynam ic systems, since it is an interaction betw een a cognitive system and its environm ent. Both systems · can be characterized by having their own subsystems for interaction, · are following their own dynam ics and try to in¯uence and modulate each other.
Although cognitive systems are also part of the environm ent, in particular, the human cognitive system tries to achieve a state of hom eostasis ( = the criterion for life and / or survival) by externalizing certain behaviors that modulate the internal and external environment in a bene® cial way. In any case, a complex pattern of interactions and diOE erent levels of knowledge are involved in this interaction (see Peschl 1994b for further details). The basic assumption is that a cogn itive system has to hold som e kind of inform atio n or know ledge about its environm ent, and thus, representation of knowledge, in order to survive in this environm ent. Representation still matters.
2.3.3. The Com puter. The idea of computer-supported task accomplishment is to transfer parts of representational structures ( = knowledge to solve a certain problem or task) from users into a computer program thatÐ by making use of these know ledge structuresÐ is then capable of m imicking certain cogn itive capacities at some level of abstraction. The computer system runs these program s automatically by exclusively transform ing and manipulating strings of bits according to certain rules which are determined by algorithms or heuristics. As it is the case with any other artifacts, it is only the act of interpretation by a hum an that brings m eaning into these meaningless patterns, as they are perceived as meaningful sym bols as soon as displayed on the screen, or as soon as they are perceived as sound-wave s and interpreted as spoken language. The computer system' s output triggers and modulates the cognitive / representational dynam ics of the hum an user who is interacting with the computer system (and vice versa).
Pitfalls in knowledge acquisition and representation
The epistemologically relevant part of human-computer interaction, where the latter is considered as an interaction betw een two dynam ically coupled systems, is the process of transferring knowledge from the human cognitive system to the representational structure of the computer system (data structures, algorithms, rule system s, semantic networks, neural netw orks etc.). H ow does the computer system and its representational structure obtain the`knowledge' that allows them to solve a problem or to achieve a certain task? There are at least two answers to this question which do not necessarily mutually exclude each other (and we will actually integrate the resulting options for representation and acquisition in section 3):
(i) The knowledge is transferred from the human (expert) to the computer system. Som e kind of m apping between the human' s representation system and the computer system' s representation m echanisms (e.g., data structures, program s) is de® ned. M ost of the current knowledge engineering techniques rely on the following procedure: W hen humans make experiences in the real world ( = environment), they construct knowledge and theories about the environm ent. This knowledge can be externalized by using some kind of language . These linguistic expressions are then form alized by a knowledge engineer or a program mer, and transform ed into algorithms, rules, and / or data structures. H ence, the computer system makes use of already prede® ned or pre-represented' representations. The outstanding feature of computer systems is that they are able to handle syntactically huge am ounts of data which normally cannot be m anaged by a human at the sam e level of abstraction. They allow to m anipulate data with extremely high speed and accuracy, and thereby to m ake structures explicitly availab le, such as the rules they follow when processing inferences.
(ii) The computer system itself learns from its experiences' with the environment in a trialand-error process. This strategy is the one that m ost of the approaches in the domain of arti® cial neural networks, com putational neuroscience, e.g., Rumelhart et al. (1986) Holland (1975) , Goldberg (1989 Goldberg ( ), M itchell et al. (1994 , follow. The basic idea can be summarized as follows: In the beginning of the learning procedure the computer system has (alm ost) no useful knowledge (to ful® ll the desired task), i.e. its behavior follows random patterns. Learning algorithm s or genetic operators adapt their representational structure (i.e. synaptic weigh ts, genetic code etc.) in a trial-and-error process until some useful or desired behavior (judged by humans) is achieved through the representational structure. This strategy is similar to the processes that occur whenever a human or any natural system has to learn som ething. He / she / it adapts to certain environm ental regularities that are useful for the system' s survival in order to make use of them in a bene® cial way. In both cases the result is a representational structure (in the brain or in the computer system) that is said to be capable of dealing successfully with certain aspects of the environm ental dynam ics in the context of accom plishing a certain task, such as solving a problem. The diOE erence between this and issue (i) is that no prefabricated chunks of knowledge are mapped / transferred to the representation systemÐ the cognitive / computer system rather has to ® gure out a way to solve a certain problem by adapting its knowledge structures in a trialand-error process.
In both cases the implicit assum ption about representation is that the resulting knowledge structure in the computer system has some kind of similarity or even iso / hom omorphic relationships to the environmental structure, as for instance in case (i). Looking more closely at this assumption, it implies some kind of homomorphic relationship between the structure of the environm ent, of the representation in the (human) cognitive system, as well as of the representation in the computer system . As we will see, cognitivists argue that due to this relationship of (structural) similarity it is possible to enable hum ans to solve the problem of survival in their environment. M oreover, hum ans are able to solve problems with this kind of`structure preserving' representation, computer systems can do sim ilar things by applying the sam e representational mechanism.
M ost approaches to cognitive modeling in human ± computer interaction follow the traditional understanding of cognitive engineering. M odels following this tradition are based on sym bol manipulation or propositions, and have not been as successful as originally hoped. Their success has been limited to rather specialized domains that can easily be described by formal speci® cation techniques, such as ® rst order logic. In the following, the reasons why traditional cognitive models, and thus, traditional representation techniques cannot be utilized for semantic and pragm atic representation in a straightforward way, will be described.
2.4.1. Shifting Semantics. It has becom e evident in the ® eld of knowledge engineering, e.g., van de Riet (1987) (in particular with logic-based representationsÐ see Peschl 1994) , and software engineering, e.g., Downs (1987) , that in the process of extracting knowledge from an expert or a user, and transferring it into a com puter system a lot of inform ation gets lost for various reasons (certain parts of the knowledge can not be verbalized, cannot be formalized etc.). It does matter not only that information gets lost in the process, but also that semantics is changed in many cases. In fact, it seems that the so-called loss of information is only an extreme case of a change in the semantics. This observation does not only aOE ect sym bolic knowledge representation, but also pictorial representation, such as visual am biguities. It has to be considered to be crucial for human ± com puter interaction, as most of these`sem an tic shifts' occur at the critical step when one kind of knowledge representation is transformed into another.
Semantic shifts in the process of transferring knowledge from humans to computer systems and vice versa occur due to a variety of reasons:
(a) N atural language is the major instrument to externalize human (internal) knowledge. As has been shown by Polanyi (1966) , Berry (1987) and others, any kind of language is capable of externalizing only a small fraction of the sem antics that hum ans have in m ind when they try to externalize a particular chunk of knowledge by making use of language. Hence, thè tacit' or`implicit' knowledge is not only lost in the moment of externalization, but also some kind of semantic distortion occurs. Due to the individual diOE erences in onto-and phylo-genetic experiences of humans diOE erent receivers of an (externalized) language utterance will interpret these per se meaningless, syntactic environmental patterns diOE erently, and in a diOE erent way from the sender of the message. Although both parties are referring to the sam e environm ental pattern / syntactic structure, they have diOE erent m eanings in mind' when they are using it or referring to it.
(b) W henever someone / thing is externalizing behavior through (language) sym bols, and someone / thing else tries to interpret these per se meaningless artifacts, the semantics for diOE erent users and / or designers and / or experts might diOE er considerably. Although they are confronted with the sam e sym bol, icon, graphical representation etc., these artifacts might trigger diOE erent internal representations and semantics in the participating cognitive systems. As a consequence, the occurrence of semantic shifts cannot be avoided in principle. (c) Despite all attempts to introduce`sem antic features' into sym bol systems, natural language is deprived of its ® nal semantic features and dim ension in the process of formalization. Hence, the distortion is taken even one step further in the process of formalizing natural language into purely syntactic and formal structures. Sym bolic representations (as well as pictorial representations) remain syntactic in principle. Losing the semantic dim ension implies, however, m ore freedom in the process of interpreting these syntactic / formal structures that, in turn, m ay lead to unintended sem antic shifts. (d) In most of the arti® cial representation systems a lack of sym bol grounding can be found, e.g. Schefe (1990) . Semantics is assum ed to be somehow externally de® ned or given. Furthermore, it is assumed that the semantics is more or less stable over a period of tim e. Epistemological considerations reveal, however, that:
(i) semantics change individually in minimal increm ents (according to the experiences that individuals make); (ii) there is no construct such as`the one given semantics'Ð public as well as private semantics are a steady¯ow. Semantics is alw ays system -dependent and communication is based on mutually adapting the individual use of sym bolsÐ com pare also the concept of a consensual dom ain as basis for a public semantics, e.g., Becker (1991) , Glasersfeld (1983 Glasersfeld ( , 1984 Glasersfeld ( ), M aturana (1978 Glasersfeld ( ) , M aturana et al. (1980 .
Consequently, the idea of (a) a somehow externally (or`naturally' ) given semantics as well as (b) of holding the semantics stable does not workÐ knowledge representation techniques should rather provide m eans to deal with the phenomenon of an`experience-based individual and dynam ic semantics' .
Clari® cation of M utual Unde rstanding.
As mentioned already, a m ajor distortion of semantics occurs in the process of transforming one form of representation into another, nam ely, in the process when an internal representation is externalized and received by another system and transformed into its internal representational format. This process happens in any type of hum an ± computer interaction. The problem here is that, in contrast to human ± human interaction, it is di cult for both parties to ask whether the respective system really`understood' what the other was trying to convey. This fact is due to the im plicit assum ption, however, not working assumption, that language and even pictorial / iconic representations are based on a stable and somehow`given' semantics. Hence, misunderstandings in hum an ± computer interaction cannot be clari® ed the sam e way as in hum an ± human interaction. Even in hum an ± human communication a 100 per cent overlap can not be guaranteed (cf. Glasersfeld 1983).
2.4.3. Passive M appin g. Both in propositional and in pictorial representations the underlying idea of representation can be characterized as follows: the environm ent is mapped more or less passively to the representational substratum. Although most approaches in this ® eld distance themselves from the idea of a naive m apping (i.e. naive realism ), an unam biguous stable referential / representational relationship between the structure of the environment and the structure of the representational space is postulated. A sym bol or a (mental) image refers to, represents, or stands for a certain phenomonen, state, or aspect of the (internal or external) environm ent.
Empirical research in neuroscience gives evidence that no such stable and unam biguous referential relationship between repraesentans and repraesentandum can be found (K andel et al. 1991 , Churchland et al. 1992 , Shepherd 1990 . A referential representational relationship can be found only in peripheral parts of the nervous system . But even in these areas there is no evidence for real stability, as the original stimulus is distorted in the process of transduction. It seems that neural system s do not follow this assumption of a referential representational relationship. As it is discussed in Peschl (1994) there are not only empirical, but also epistemological and system-theoretical reasons why the concept of referential representation does not apply to neural system s. It can be shown that in highly recurrent neural architectures (as our brain) neither patterns of activations nor synaptic / weight con® gurations, nor trajectories in the activation space do refer to environm ental even ts / states in a stable (referential) manner. This fact is due to the in¯uence of the internal state on the whole representational dynam ics of (as well as on the input to) the neural system. As an implication, it becomes necessary to rethink the representational relationship between the environm ent and the representation system (see below). Questioning this relationship is crucial for designing human ± computer interfaces, as their design is based on assumptions stemming from a referential understanding of representations, such as icons, symbols, images of desktops etc.
Static and Dynam ic Coupling .
Tw o diOEerent aspects of representation are relevant to investigate the problem of coupling a cognitive system to its environment, as it occurs in the course of hum an-com puter interaction: (i) mapping or modeling the environm ent to / in the representational structure, i.e. the goal is an adequate and accurate model, picture, description etc. of the environm ent; (ii) generating (adequate) behavior: an equally important task of a representation system is to enable and to generate behavior that allows the system to accomplish a certain task, such as solving a problem .
Both in the propositional and pictorial approach the aspect of mapping the environment to the representational substratum is more important than the aspect of gen erating behavior. The implicit assumption of these approaches is as follows. If the environment is represented / depicted as accurately as possible, then it will be extrem ely easy to generate behavior that adequately ® ts into the environment (that ful® lls a desired task). As language an d / or hum an images seem to represent our environm ent successfully, it follows that accurate predictions can be made by making use of these representations. Thus, the environmental dynam ics can be manipulated, predicted, and / or anticipated e ciently with this kind of representation. In other words, in case the criterion of accurately mapping the environment to the representational substratum can be met, designers do not have to care about the aspect of generating adequate behavior.
Instability of Referential Relationship.
From the constructivist perspective, according to Glasersfeld (1984 Glasersfeld ( , 1995 Glasersfeld ( ), M aturana et al. (1980 , Varela et al. (1991) , Roth (1994), and W atzlawick (1984) , the claim for an`accurate mapping' should not and cannot be met, since humans will never have direct access to the structure of the environm ent. Hence, it is impossible to determine how`accurate' ,`true' , or`close' the representation of the environm ent compared to the`real' environment actually is. The only level of accuracy that can be determined is the diOEerence between (cognitive) representations of the environment and the (computational) representations that have been constructed by engineers. In many cases it has turned out, however, that the hum an representation of the environment is not the best solution to a given problem Ð consequently, it is questionable to elevate the human way of representing the environment above other forms of representation and to use it as a standard again st which other forms of representation have to compete. It is by no means clear why the human (cognitive or even scienti® c) representation of the world should be m ore accurate or more adequate than any other form of representation.
As it has been discussed previously, there is no empirical evidence for explicit propositional or`picturelike' representations in the brain. This fact also implies that neural systems do not generate adequate behavior by making use of referential representations. It rather turns out that any natural nervous system is the result of a phylo-and onto-genetic process of adaptation and development. The goal of this process is not to create an accurate model or representation of the environment, but rather to develop these physical (body and representational / neural) structures that embody a (recurrent) transformation capable of generating functionally ® tting ( = successful) behavior. In natural (cognitive) systems it seem s that the aspect of generating behavior is more important than the aspect of developing an accurate m odel or internal`picture' of the environm ent. W hat we can learn from these systems and their adaptational strategies is that it is not necessary for a system to possess an accurate mapping / representation of the environment in order to generate successful behavior. Since`accurate representation' of the environment means`accurate' with respect to other cognitive systems' representation of the environm ent, it does not follow necessarily that aǹ inaccurate' representation might not lead to more e cient behavior.
Constructivist cognitive engine ering for task-based and user-oriented interaction
After having speci® ed fundamental problems of knowledge representation and acquisition, we have to put these ® ndings into the context of cognitive engineering for user interface development. W hen discussing user interface developm ent based on nowadays technology and workplace design we have to be aw are of the following facts: (i) M ultiple M odalities for Interaction. In the beginning, user interfaces have been mostly designed com mand-oriented because of the machine' s limitations to handle a variety of media, channels, and modalities at a tim e. Today, the technology support in principle the developm ent of adaptable and¯exible interaction modalities. At the sam e tim e, the goals the engineers have to achieve have become more and m ore complex, if not contradictory. For instance, computer systems not only have to be easy for most users to handle, but also to be capable of supporting trained users to exploit the artifact for more complex purposes. (ii) Com plex Task Accom plishm ent. M oreover, problem solving, i.e. task accomplishment, is ofteǹ fuzzy' or`wicked' in the sense, that it cannot be described precisely in advan ce. In such cases, solutions can only be found by moving from partial problem solvin g results via learning from experience to a more complete understanding.
Before providing a synergistic approach to cognitive engineering we have to give the implications of the ® ndings in section 2 for the acquisition of know ledge about tasks an d end users as well as representing the acquired knowledge in design models. Knowledge about tasks and end users is mutually related, since:
(i) constructivist cognitive models represent users.
Their activities depend on their intentions which allow s us to conclude that there is an indirect relationship between these intentions and the tasks they have to perform (Dutke 1994, p. 12 ). (ii) fragm ented pieces of observation when represented in cognitive models may not result in any mean ingful implications when they are not exam ined in the context of end user task perform ance (Chen et al. 1997, p. 27 ).
Section 3.1 deals with epistemological consequences of the ® ndings presented in section 2.4 for know ledge acquisition and representation. In section 3.2 a taskbased fram ework for representation is enhanced with a sub-symbolic representation scheme for cognitive end user modeling. The ap proach is a conceptual and practical one to overcome the addressed de® ciencies of traditional techniques for the acquisition and representation of end users, their functional roles and individual knowledge for task accomplishm ent.
Epistemologica l consequences for user interface developm ent
3.1.1. Predictable User Behavior? M ost of the current models of cognition are based on the (implicit) assumption that human s are perfect logicians when they perform their tasks. Humans are assumed to be able to`determine' (complete a task) in a ® nite time span, e.g., Lenat (1988) . The prerequisite to make this assum ption work is to identify a proper representation of task accomplishment in ® rst order logic. Church has proven a theorem stating that there is no algorithm within the predicate calculus that can achieve that predictability. M oreover, ® nite articulation and ® nitè run-time behavior' does not relate to hum an cognition and behavioral dynam ics, and consequently, to conceptualized cognitive models. The underlying neural structures of natural cognitive systems follow a radically diOE erent dynam ic. Cognitive system s have to be understood as dynam ic systems (e.g. Gelder et al. 1995 rather than as logical theorem provers. (Hum an) logic is only a second or third order (representational) phenomenon that emerges at the level of so-called higher cognitive processes (Peschl et al. 1988) . In any case, it is based on fundam ental neural processes that do not follow the structure and dynam ics of ® rst order logic. Traditional techniques from arti® cial intelligence, such as sym bol processing or ® rst order logic, postulate that the emergent level of logic represents an adequate description, explanation, and m odel for the underlying internal neural / cognitive processes (see below). In contrast to that, empirical research in cognitive neuroscience, e.g., Kandel et al. (1991) , gives evidence that no such logical structures can be found on any neural level.
Em pirical Evidence?
Although empirical / neuroscienti® c evidence for the propositional as well as pictorial ap proach for representation and processing is rather poor, there are areas in the brain that seem to be related to the processing of language , semantics, propositions, mental images etc. However, the only ® nding that is known from these areas is that if these brain areas are dam aged in one way or the other, certain cognitive abilities are not present any more (Kandel et al. 1991 , Churchland et al. 1992 . Neuroscience provides alm ost no knowledge or theories concerning the processing mechanisms / architecture underlying these cognitive phenomena. From this poor evidence it seems to be questionable to postulate explicit representational concepts for human-oriented (isomorphic) cognitive engineering, such as the pictorial or propositional paradigm does.
3.1.3. Semantics M atters. Even when semantics and pragm atics becom e part of traditional cognitive models, such as proposed in Newell (1982 Newell ( , 1989 and Sticklen (1990) , the resulting mechanisms for problem solving require dynam ic checking again st the validity of the represented knowledge. Following the tradition of other sub-disciplines in computer science and considering hum ans as well as machines to be information-proces-sing systems exchan ging does not facilitate this task, due to the separation of, syntactic, semantic, and pragm atic aspects (`... thus it is a hypothesis that these sym bols are in fact the sam e sym bols that we humans have and use everyd ay of our lives. Stated another way, the hypothesis is that humans are instances of physical sym bol systems, ... ' Newell (1980), p. 116) . This`Physical Sym bol System s Hypothesis' is widely used for modeling cognition, e.g., New ell et al. (1989) , and has been proven useful for behavior-oriented models in commercial arti® cial-intelligence applications. However, the results can only be used in limited problem dom ains, e.g., Ernst et al. (1986) . As long as the application of sym bols remains restricted to the level of syntactic processes, that hypothesis m ay be justi® ed. W henever it is applied to more complex domains, such as human ± computer interaction, it has to be re¯ected epistemologically, e.g., Peschl (1990) , to provide evidence for usability at the semantic level.
Structure Versus Behavior?
In both the pictorial and the propositional approaches to representation a similar concept of processing is applied. An algorithm manipulates / operates on the representational structure (i.e. on the sym bols or mental images). There is a clear distinction between the processing part and the representations, on which these processes operate (i.e. processor-mem ory distinction). The processing part seems to be actively involved in the dynam ics of the system, as it operates on the representations. The representations, on the other hand, seem to play a rather passive role for two reasons: (a) as mentioned above, they are the result of having been projected from the hum an representation system to the arti® cial representation system (i.e. they are passive in the sense of being preprocessed and passively mapped); (b) an algorithm executes operations over these representations which are assum ed to stay in a stable relationship with the environm ent, i.e. they remain rather passive as they are manipulated by an algorithm similarly as humans manipulate the (passive) matter of the environment.
This concept of distinguishing between processing and memory has its roots in the structure of the Turing machine that inspired the computer metaphor for cognitive processes. In neural systems, however, no such distinction can be found. Usually, the synaptic connections / weights are considered to`hold the knowledge' of the neural system. Patterns of neural activations are assumed to be responsible for the representation of the current representational state. It is not clear which part of the system takes over the role of the processor. Furtherm ore, the synaptic weights ( = the neural system' s`knowledge' ) turn out to be not passive at allÐ they are responsible for controlling the¯ow / spreading of the patterns of activations. It can be concluded that it is the interaction between the patterns of activations and the con® guration of the synaptic weights that is responsible for both the representation of the knowledge and for generating the system' s behavioral dynam ics.
3.1.5. Functionalism = Neo-Behavior ism? The lack of empirical evidence might be one of the reasons why traditional cognitive modeling restricts itself to a functionalistic account in most cases. Cognitive models describe the functional properties that can be derived from the`behavioral surface' of the observed cognitive system. These behavioral descriptions are used as explanatory vehicles' for internal representational processes. A lot of speculation an d commonsense concepts are involved in these explanations / theories about internal representational processes, as the actual internal / neural structures are not taken into account.
However, with the advent of modern techniques, theories, and methods in empirical neuroscience, as well as of novel concepts from computational neuroscience, such as proposed by Churchland et al. (1990) , Churchland et al. (1992) , Anderson et al. (1991 ), Han son et al. (1990 , Gazzaniga (1995) , Sejnowski et al. (1990) , basic concepts have been discovered that can be applied to any level of neural processing. They address the spreading of activations, distributed processing and representation, adaptive processes,`Hebbian' learning as the basis for an y kind of learningÐ LTP, LTD etc., according to Hebb (1949) , Brown et al. (1990) , Nicoll et al. (1988) and others. These ® ndings already suggest a completely diOE erent concept of (neural) representation mechanisms / concepts than the propositional and / or pictorial approaches postulate.
Static and dynam ic user mode ling in TA DEUS
In this subsection we will revisit TADEUS, a modeling ap proach and an environment for task-based and user-oriented user interface prototyping and generation. Since the approach has been restricted to static modeling, the user model will be enhanced with dynam ic modeling facilities, meeting the objectives for constructivist cognitive engineering.
The TADEUS (Task Analysis / Design / End User Systems) approach (Stary 1996a , Stary et al. 1997a ) provides a framework (in the sense of a global reference m odel, see ® gure 3) for representation, a methodology, and a corresponding environm ent for user interface developm ent. The inputs for the developm ent of the TA DEUS framework and representation scheme have been provided by techniques from work¯ow modeling as well as by user interface description language s. TADEUS aim s at integrating task-based and user-oriented developnent of interactive software, as these issues are m utually related (see the beginning of this section).
The understanding of end users and their organization of work requires a conceptual framework of context-sensitive components for interactive systems: task m odel (including a model of the organization and its work¯ow), problem dom ain (data) model, user model and interaction model. All of these have to be related to each other statically and dynam ically.
The task m odel comprises the splitting up of end user tasks according to the economic and social organization of work. The user model details the individual perception of tasks, data structures and interaction devices, such as personal experience and preferences, access modalities to tasks and data, individual task organization, and social conventions at the work place. The data model provides the static and dynam ic information about the functionality of the system and has to be derived from the task model. The interaction model captures all devices and styles that are required by the users during interaction. In relation to the task and the data model, all presentation issues concerning tasks, functions, and data structures have to be speci® ed in the interaction model.
In order to enable work¯ow-oriented prototyping TADEUS has been based on a single-object oriented notation, nam ely the one proposed for Object-Oriented Systems Analysis OSA (Embley et al. 1992) . H ence, the knowledge about the functionality of an interface, as well as about the behavior (how tasks are accomplished) can be kept encapsulated, transparent and consistent throughout analysis, design and implementation. M oreover, since the design is speci® ed in an object-oriented notation, code can automatically be generated from the representations in the TA DEU S environm ent.
The basic design activities using TA DEU S for user interface development are as follows:
· specify a task and user (role) model according to the organization of work;
· derive a data model from the tasks and user organization (as speci® ed in the task model) in the problem domain;
· establish an interaction model through the integration of the task model and the data model with interaction devices and styles (modalities); · give the functional speci® cation after or while prototyping with end users, in order to generate code.
In order to develop a user model, the designer has to ® nd answers to the following questions: · W ho are the users of the system? · How do they perceive and accomplish tasks? · W hich artifacts do they use to perceive and accomplish their tasks and how do they use these artifacts?
· W hat kind of data do they need to manipulate to achieve their tasks? · How do they arrange these data for task accomplishment?
The designer might follow the subsequent procedure to provide the required inputs for setting up the user m odel:
(1) Identify the functional roles required for task accom plishm ent. Information might be found in charts describing the organization of work and the quali® cation pro® les for the tasks. Interviews and other data acquisition methods are advised to achieve a complete description. (3) Identify the artifacts that the users (want to) use to accom plish the tasks. Interaction media that are used for task accom plishments are de® ned. (4) De® ne the data that the users need to manipulate. For each user or user group the data have to be acquired that have to be manipulated from the organizational as well as individual perspective.
Designers may handle user, interaction and data modeling separately as long as required, as long as they act within the context of the task model. Finally, an (object) architecture remains to be implemented as the result of several m odeling activitiesÐ a strategy conven tionally followed in traditional object-oriented developm ent. H ow ever, the design process can be kept as a loose order of speci® cation activities and mutual adaptation procedures within and between diOEerent models (see also the semantic relationships in Figure 3 for the integrated process of software, data, and dialog engineering).
Since the starting point for system design is a proper representation of the knowledge acquired through business analysis, TA D EU S supports the representation of the¯ow of work comprising the static and dynam ic organization of tasks, positions and roles of people involved in task accom plishment. The Object Relationship Diagram (ORD) in Figure 4 of an airline agency is an exam ple for the structural representation of that type of design knowledge.
State transition diagram s (Object Behavior Diagram s OB Ds) have to be speci® ed, in order to re¯ect the detailed process of task accomplishment, and ® nally, the behavior of the application to be built. The tasks (activities) involved in the described business in Figure  4 are the handling of Flight Request and Ticket Request. The roles of people involved are Employee, Customer, M anager, and Agent. The temporal relationship used in the ORD for indicating the¯ow of work is`before' . Data¯ow speci® cations are speci® ed through`utters' to provide the required input for task accomplishment in the ORD. The passing of control information is also captured in the ORDs through informs' between M anager and Agent after updatinḡ ight data. Several assignment relationships are used for further task description and the TADEUS model integration:
· between tasks and roles, e.g. Agent`handles' Flight Request; · between tasks and subjects of work, e.g. Update
Request`concerns' Flight;
· between roles and subjects of work, e.g. Agent attempts to match¯ight request with' Flight. In the following these conceptual relationships are detailed in their respective context: Figure 4 . A Sample Object Relationship Diagram ORD of an Airline Agency, comprising user roles, tasks, and problem dom ain data (i.e. an integrated view of three TADEU S models).
Handles
Involves: roles, activities (tasks). M eaning: denotes the responsibility of a role for a particular activity: The person behind the role may:
· delegate this activity to another agent and / or · control its accomplishment, or · perform it by him / herself.
Creates
Involves: roles, activities (tasks, sub-tasks), problem dom ain data.
M eaning: denotes the creation of data through a subtask or task.
Conce rns
Involves:
· roles via`handles' or`controls', · activities (tasks or sub-tasks), · problem dom ain data, · relevant factors for task accomplishment (e.g., quality measures).
M eaning:
· denotes un-speci® c, · mediate mutual in¯uence of data, factors or activities.
The activities are involved through their assignm ent to roles that are considered to denote the responsible persons for that activity. The latter situation is expressed through the`handles' relationship between role and activity.
Relevant factors capture organ izational or social settings that are not further re® ned in the course of application development.
In case no role can be assigned to an activity, informs' is used to relate functional roles (see below).
Informs
M eaning: denotes the passing of information (about data or an activity) from one role to another.
Comments: it denotes the¯ow of com munication with or without dataÐ the option is indicated through a wildcard(*).
Controls
Involves: roles, activities (tasks, sub-tasks), problem dom ain data. M eaning: denotes the control of activities or data (that might concern an activity) through a role.
Is-part-of
M eaning: denotes sub-tasks of tasks or sub-tasks; it is su cient to specify one or more sub-tasks that are related temporally to other sub-tasks.
The relationships are kept consistent through TA DEUS checks throughout the entire development. These checks are provided through particular algorithms for each of the relationships: they implement the C. Stary and M . F. Peschl 354 Figure 10. The semantic relationship`is-part-of' relevant for static user modeling in TADEU S. Figure 9 . The semantic relationship`controls' in TADEUS. Figure 11 . Sample Object Behavior Diagram (OBD) for the user role`Agent' handling a¯ight request.
intended semantics at a syntactic, procedural layer. For instance, the`before' relationship in the ORD in Figure  4 is checked in all the OB Ds involving the handling of ight and ticket requests (e.g., in the OBD shown in Figure 11 ). Figure 11 shows a work¯ow for the handling of¯ight requests, as stereotypically performed by airline agents. This way the intended behavior of people and artifacts from the organization' s perspective becom es transparent, and static user modeling is enabled from the perspective of task accomplishment.
In order to speci® y the user interface, interaction features speci® ed in the interaction model have to be assigned to the tasks (presenting them to end users) as well as to the data that are going to be manipulated in the course of task accomplishment, for details see Stary et al. (1997a ) . In order to ® nalize the overall speci® cation of an application in TA D EUS, the OBD s of the involved interaction modalities have to be synchronized with task and data handling procedures that are represented in OBDs, too. This way, the life cycles of the objects involved in interaction are synchronized.
As can easily be recognized from this approach, cogn itive models of users, such as the airline agent, will remain stereotypical as proposed by Rich (1979) and driven by the idea to build and maintain long term models of individual users, e.g., Finin et al. (1985) . Stereotypical cognitive engineering and thus, static user modeling has been based on traditional sym bolic representation and processing mechanism, such as, e.g. described in Newell et al. (1989) . Although they might be based on end user tasks, static user modeling assum es an ideal user that will follow exactly prede® ned sequences of function calls to accomplish a task. However, there are more perspectives involved in interactive task accomplishm ent. As Tauber (1991) has demonstrated in ETAG , the user' s perspective has to be considered and modeled explicitly. This requirement leads to the rethinking of the TADEUS user modeling approach. According to Beale et al. (1992) static and dynam ic user modeling are complem entary components of user interfaces, where the · static user m odel is constructed to understand the behavior of these end users that are considered to be the most representative ones (key users), and the · dynam ic user model accounts for various individual behaviors of users within the context of task accomplishment. Static M odeling . W e will use dynam ic user m odeling to identify user behavior patterns that do not only re¯ect the individual user perception of interaction features, but also the individual organization of tasks within the limits of the task domain. Hence, the OBD for task accomplishment in Figure 11 as well as the assignm ent of interaction modalities to tasks and in / output components for data manipulation might undergo signi® cant changes according to individual needs and preferences.
Dynam ic User M odeling Coupled with
In order to recognize, classify by tasks, and adjust user patterns in chan ging environm ents traditional representation and analysis techniques did not meet the expectations in dynam ic user modeling, e.g., Ye et al. (1991) , Beale et al. (1992) , Sanchez et al. (1992) . As the m ajor reason for de® ciencies, the ine ciency of handling knowledge in traditional knowledge engineering has been identi® ed. Neural networks, e.g., Rumelhardt et al. (1986) , provide m ore e cient m echanisms to handle implicit knowledge and process knowledge in parallel. In particular, neural network techniques allow for e cient exam ination of observed information before a system decision is made, since noise and inconsistencies m ight hinder com pleting cognitive models or user pro® les (Chen et al. 1997) .
M odeling the know ledge about end user task accomplishment dynam ically facilitates system adaptation and improves the eOE ectiveness of feedback to users meeting their abilities and cognitive style. Hence, an application should be able to infer what a user knows in a task and interaction dom ain. W ith the help of pattern association default reasoning can be simulated to create a semantically signi® cant num ber of outputs according to a m inimal set of inputs. Table 1 . Part of the adjacency matrix for handling a¯ight request through agents (see also ® gure 11). From the cognitive engineering perspective the dynam ic user model in TADEUS is constructed from a prede® ned`best-practice' -approach for task accomplishment (i.e. the negotiated model before implementation, as demanded by W inograd et al. 1986) as follows:
Step 1: Identify the Starting Point: Starting point can be any Object Behavior Diagram OBD of the TA D EUS design representation. Hence, we follow the sam e principle as we did for the static design. The designer might select a particular perspective (and subsequently switch between several perspectives) of an application without having the risk to cause inconsistent behavior of the application, since all parts of an application' s speci® cations are mutually linked and each of them is updated correspondingly. As a consequence, user modeling might start from any perspective the designer has developed so far in the course of re® ning the task model. Hence, the starting OBD might either concern the presentation and organization of · tasks in the workspace · data required for task accomplishment · interaction modalities.
Although dynam ic user modeling might start with any perspective, it has to be noted that all activities are performed within the context of the Object Relationship Diagram (ORD ) of the task model. It captures the essential structure of tasks and task accomplishment which cannot be questioned by the users, since it is the backbone of the business at hand. H ence, the global logic of a business process cannot be manipulated at the level of dynam ic (or static) user m odeling. W hat can be adapted, are the presentation of tasks, the selection of a set of preferred ways to solve problem s, and the way data for task accomplishment are arranged, i.e. the coupling of data and task managem ent with interaction m odalities.
Dynam ic user modeling might lead to a change of paths (state transitions) in OBD s that constitute the life cycles of objects. Since the OBDs that serve as input to the dynam ic user modeling part of TADEUS represent the ideal case or assumed best practice of task accomplishment (according to the tradition of static user m odeling), they can be considered to be an ideal input for a learning mechan ism such as a neural network. This situation corresponds to the case when an employee starts doing his / her job on the very ® rst day, and is provided with a VDU-workplace description from the managem ent. Such a description captures default assum ptions about the features for interaction and the organization of tasks. This starting point is then successively changed according to the individual style of work of the employee.
In summary, for step 1 a particular OBD has to be selected, e.g., the one shown in Figure 11 . It represents the default task accomplishment from the organ ization of tasks an d business logic at hand.
Step 2: Perform Graph-M atrix Analysis: The paths of the OBD selected in step 1 are converted to sets of paired actions that become entries of a so-called adjacency matrix (M cG rew 1992), see table 1:`1' in a cell indicates that there is a link between two states in the OBD, e.g., between`acquire¯ight options' and search repository for matching¯ight' ,`0' indicates that there is no connection between the involved states.
The perm utation of corresponding rows and columns enables the rearrangem ent of the relations represented by the entries. This way, underlying behavior patterns might become evident, in particular, since the matrix is not only used to represent the assum ed ideal behavior, but also the actual individual behavior end users follow. In the latter case, the entries of the matrix contain the frequency of all the actually followed sequences of state transitionsÐ the cells of the matrix might contain higher num bers than 1, in order to represent the frequency. This procedure might be applied for a set of users, if the designer is interested in clustering user behavior over the entire population of end users.
Step 3: Neural Networking: In this step the matrix is fed to a Kohonen network. It is a self-organizing (i.e. unsupervized) associative memory system (Kohonen 1989 , Kohenen et al. 1992 . Hence, learning occurs · without being biased by any observer (as it has been the case for static user modeling by the analys t or designer), and · without indicating desired behavior (output) to given inputs. According to the individual behavior of an end user · data are collected with respect to the selected sequence of state transitions; · behavioral patterns can be identi® ed through categorizing sequences of state transitions; and · user behavior can be predicted, as soon as the user enters a particular sequence.
The procedure for these activities is the following: Each accomplishment of tasks is represented through an adjacency matrix. Feeding it to a Kohenen network leads to a vector representation of the matrix: Each row of the matrix corresponds to a vector. Each vector has as many elements as states m ight be involved in task accomplishment.
The Kohonen network comprises 96 nodes in a hexago nal space. Hence, the input vectors have to be mapped on this space: For each state of the OBD a node of the network is assigned. The assign ed nodes represent the set of marker vectors. In the course of learning, i.e. processing input vectors that stem from any task cycle in the OBD , the states have to be recognized by the netw ork. Those states that are recognized, are marked (labeled). Some of the states will be recognized (i.e. assigned to prede® ned nodes), some of them will be assigned to separate nodes of the network. Finally, each node of the network that identi® ed a state contains a vector of the weights of the state relative to the other states. This way those states that are mutually related beyo nd a certain threshold, e.g.,`0' , can be interpreted to be strongly connected: Patterns of preferred interaction features might occur that can be the basis for further analyses.
Step 4: Extract Consequences for Further Development / Future Application Behavior : In case the runtime of the application environment is able to react immediately the recognized behavior can be supported directly. In any case, the result of the learning process should be retransferred to an OBD that can be contrasted with the OBD that has been identi® ed as the starting point for dynam ic user modeling (step 1). As a consequence: · regularities in user behavior for task accomplishment could be visualized; · problem solving activities could be optimized, rede® ning the initially assum ed`best practice' of accomplishing tasks, e.g. through high-level activities (m acros); · multiple patterns for accessing the sam e information could becom e evident or be derived; · user pro® les could be established.
Conclusions
User interface developm ent and software cannot be treated in an isolated way anym ore, as traditionally assum ed by developers. In the ® eld of user m odeling it has been recognized that`system' s beliefs about users should be based on the context of the user' s task performance. The fragm ented pieces of observations may not result in any meaningful implications if they are not exam ined associatively' (Chen et al. 1997, p. 27 ). Development and performance should rather follow an integrated approach, capturing the: · software engineering perspective for structured developm ent and functional design; · data engineering perspective for de® ning a proper data m odel; · business process (re-)engineering perspective, in order to capture the nature and¯ow of tasks and the organization they are embedded in; · knowledge engineering perspective to enable machine intelligence through adapting the user interface and the application towards individual user needs as well as to organizational changes; and, last but not least, the · dialog engineering perspective, in order to take into account components and styles of interaction.
In becoming aw are of the demand for integration, another requirement becomes evident, nam ely to ach ieve design representations that feature an implem entation-independent handling of the structure and behavior of interactive systems. Unfortunately, current trends in industrial software developm ent, such as the provision of user interface libraries (e.g., M icrosoft' s M FC ap proach), have to be considered as a step back, since preprogram med building blocks of software deliver a behavior that cannot be put into its context at design time, e.g., Beer et al. (1998) . In particular, the gap between the current representational capabilities of cognitive models and the requirements for cognitive m odeling in hum an ± com puter interaction, does not enable cognitive models to becom e part of holistic design representations.
In order to em bed cognitive engineering approaches fully into interactive software development activities we had to reveal fundam entals in understanding cognitive m odeling and the representation of know ledge to facilitate human ± computer interaction. Hence, we ® rst analyzed the tradition in cognitive engineering which:
· emphasizes a static representation of user and task knowledge, and · enforces sym bolic representation of knowledge in terms of goals and other explicit elem ents to capture the structure and dynam ics of task accomplishment.
In addition, traditional cognitive engineering is oriented towards an idealized behavior of end users, assum ing a set of stable param eters to describe knowledge. This way, neither the individual perception of tasks and task accomplishment, nor changes in skills, preferences, abilities, and behavior can be re¯ected in tim e and accuracy.
Based on these ® ndings we had to develop a completely diOE erent understanding of human ± computer interaction, nam ely a framework that captures individuality: Human ± com puter interfaces serve as devices and a form of representation where information is exchanged between an arti® cial and a natural representation system, in order to accomplish tasks cooperatively. The representations of the computer system and the cognitive system are m utually modulating and in¯uencing each other. From that constructivist perspective, humans and the com puter should over tim e become compatible systems that trigger processes mutually. Interaction has then to be considered as a process transform ing data from one representation (system) to another one, via an environment that is neither accessible directly through the computer nor the cognitive systems of end users.
In order to provide interaction features according to cognitive constraints given by the individuals involved in interaction, we have reviewed currently availab le empirical knowledge about the dynam ics of representations in cognitive systems. It turned out that currently applied techniques for knowledge acquisition an d representation in cognitive engineering do not m eet the needs that are related to constructivist modeling. In particular, there is neither a stable referential representational relationship between the environm ent and the systems involved in interaction (which is required for traditional cogn itive modeling), nor a`naturally give n' common semantics that can be mapped onto sym bols for processing. M oreover, traditional engineering relies on a passive reception of behavior data that hinder any change.
In our solution the shortcomings have been removed through enhan cing TADEUS (Task Analysis / Design / End User Systems), a technique to acquire and represent design knowledge at an implem entation-independent layer. TA DEU S captures the context of interaction through modeling tasks and users. It integrates static and dynam ic task and user m odeling. Inform ation of the static user model serves as input to a neural network that checks the accuracy and validity of the conventionally represented design knowledge. A feedback mechanism ensures the tim ely correction of param eters of the static representation, in case changes at the user interface have occurred. The predictability of user behavior has still to be investigated, e.g. through coupling a back-propagatio n network with the proposed K ohonen layers. Further investigations and tests that should provide empirical evidence for the proposed concepts are currently performed within the TA DEU S development environment. Our further research will focus on a set of case studies whether this integrated approach is manageab le and actually reduces the time lag that is currently found, until the computer system is able to catch up with changes at the user interface. In case these studies will have led to improvem ents, the ultimate goal in human ± computer interaction has been achieved, nam ely, that user interfaces stimulate, modulate and trigger the cognitive dynam ics of their users in a way that the intended tasks can be accomplished with minimal cognitive eOE ort.
